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Introduction
The classic model of corporate law is simple: Shareholders own a
corporation, but because they are too numerous to run it efficiently, they employ
managers to do the job. The shareholders elect representatives, the directors, to
monitor the management. The directors' task is to ensure that the managers are
serving the interests of the shareholders, and not using their positions for personal
gain. This is a delicate balance: The shareholder-owners cede control to the
*Associate, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C.; J.D. University of Virginia 2001.
The views expressed herein are those of the author alone. The author would like to thank the
Hon. Thomas L. Ambro, Professor Lucian Bebchuk, Adam Gershowitz, Joshua Greenberg,
Toby Heytens, Lisa Milot, Michelle Morris, and Logan Sawyer for their comments.
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managers, who labor under the watchful eye of the directors, who look out for the
shareholders' interests and keep management honest.
In theory, anyway. This system of corporate governance can fail, and fail
spectacularly, as the corporate scandals of the recent past demonstrate. Too often
boards of directors have proved to be passive spectators, either unwilling or unable
to monitor the actions of management.
The litany of corporate scandal from the late nineties and early part of this
decade is a familiar one. Enron is perhaps the most notorious of the recent corporate
fraud cases. It set up special purpose entities whose only "purpose" was to move
money and create the illusion of profitable transactions.' It moved debts off its
balance sheet using other special purpose entities. 2 Another major scandal occurred
at WorldCom, which mischaracterized current expenses as capital expenses to allow
it to spread costs over a period of years, giving the appearance of greater financial
health and inflating its balance sheet by roughly $9 billion.3 Similar corruption
occurred at HealthSouth; management referred to the difference between Wall
Street's estimates and the company's true earnings per share as "holes," and would
search for "dirt"-i.e., fraudulent numbers-to fill them. 4 In each case, controls that
were supposed to prevent the defrauding of investors-boards of directors,
5
independent auditors, attorneys, financial analysts-failed.
This Article suggests a solution to what is perhaps the central problem of
corporate law: the separation of ownership and control. 6 Events of the last few years
have shown how this system of separation can break down when boards of directors
are unable or unwilling to monitor the management adequately. These boards
lacked "independence" from management, either because of outright conflicts of
interest, a network of social ties, or simply a general culture of board passivity.
I E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2002).
2Id.

at4.

3

Id. at 7.
Greg Farrell, HealthSouth Workers Asked to Come Forward; Prosecutor: 'Window is
Closing Very Rapidly', USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2003, at B-6.
5 As the ABA described the situation in its proposed corporate governance reforms:
Inordinate self-interest on the part of corporate executives in short term
corporate stock price levels, and instances in which that self-interest has led
to aggressive accounting or assumption of extreme business risks, were not
tempered by the checks and balances which the general corporate
governance scheme expected from the directors or the professional firms
engaged by the corporation to provide review and advice.
Am.
BAR
Ass'N, REPORT
ON GOvERNANcE
PoucY RESOLUTION 7 (2003), at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/ournal/119c.pdf [hereinafter ABA FINAL REPORT].
6 This is a longstanding problem for corporate law. In their 1932 book, THE MODERN
CORPORATION & PRrVATE PROPERTY, Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means detailed how
managers took corporations over from the shareholders that owned them.
4
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Congress, 7 the SEC,8 and public exchanges like NASDAQ and the NYSE 9
have tried to attack this problem by increasing the proportion of independent
directors and refining the definition of "independence" to prevent conflicts of
interest. Rather than pursue the Platonic ideal of a perfectly "independent" board, I
make a radical proposal: Certain corporations should voluntarily set aside one board
seat for the largest shareholder independent of management willing to serve. This
shareholder representative, as a substantial owner of the corporation, will be better
motivated to monitor the management and police for fraudulent actions than board
members selected by management or the board itself. Because the measure would
be voluntary, it would probably only be adopted by corporations seeking to erase
the taint of prior scandal and the perception of having had a board "captive" to
management. MCI (n6e WorldCom), emerging from bankruptcy, could adopt the
proposal to signal to investors: "We've changed! We have nothing to hide and to
prove it, we'll let an owner on the board to see for himself."
The idea that money should do the governing alludes to Elliot J. Weiss and
John S. Beckerman's article on class actions,10 which was the direct impetus for the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").1 Weiss and Beckerman
suggested that institutional investors and pension funds, the largest and arguably
most sophisticated of investors, were best fitted to monitor plaintiffs' attorneys in the
class action context, preventing opportunistic behavior by the plaintiffs' bar.12 Their
insight was that those with a large financial stake were best motivated, and therefore
best suited, to protect the interests of shareholders.3
The PSLRA has admittedly not produced the results its proponents
anticipated. In particular, few institutional investors have stepped in to monitor
plaintiffs' attorneys. 14 The title of this Article therefore tacitly acknowledges the
7

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
8 Div. OF CORPORATE FIN., SEC & ExcH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT:

REVIEW OF THE PROXY

12 (2003), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf [hereinafter STAFF REPORT].
9 NASD Manual Online, Rule 4200 (14)(B) at http:cchwaUstreet.com/NASD;
Corporate Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE Corporate
Accountability and Listing Standards Committee as Approved by the NYSE Board of
Directors Aug. 1, 2002, at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-gov-pro-b.pdf.
10 Elliot J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L. J. 2053
(1995).
1115 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
12Weiss & Beckerman, supranote 10, at 2126-27.
PROCESS

REGARDING

THE

NOMINATION

AND

ELECTION

OF

DIRECTORS

13Id.

14 See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard The Guardians?A New Approach for Monitoring
Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 52 (2002) ('Institutional investors have kept their safe
place on the sidelines, demonstrating outright preference against enmeshing themselves in
messy litigation.").
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potential problems raised by the proposal to rely on large shareholders for reform. It
is possible that letting the money do the governing will not fare any better than the
PSLRA, either because no corporations will adopt it or because shareholders are no
better monitors of management than traditionally selected board members. But
given recent public distrust in the validity of the financial information corporations
report to Wall Street, giving corporations the opportunity to signal that they have
nothing to hide from their shareholders does not seem particularly controversial.
Part I of the Article outlines the problems with the current method of board
Management or management-sympathetic board
selection and functioning.
members often select the board nominees, who share social ties with other board
members. Boards tend to avoid "rocking the boat" by questioning management's
recommendations, and because of the way the proxy process is structured,
shareholders cannot effectively use their votes to oust unsatisfactory board members.
Part II analyzes the SEC's recent proposals for reform, which center on
granting shareholders more opportunities to nominate candidates to the board.
These proposals attempt to give shareholders a greater voice in the election process,
but do so circuitously. They require that nominating shareholders be independent
from the candidates they nominate, missing the point that it is precisely those
individuals with a stake in the corporation that will make the best monitors.
Part III presents the mechanics of the proposed solution, suggesting that the
company offer the largest shareholder independent of management a spot on the
company's slate of director candidates (an offer tantamount to a board seat, given
the structure of the proxy process). If the largest such shareholder did not accept the
position, it would be offered to the next-largest shareholder, and so on until the seat
was filled. Because adoption of such a nomination process would be voluntary, only
companies that strongly desired to signal their status as upstanding practitioners of
responsible corporate governance would be likely to implement it. The Part
concludes by pointing out that in the venture capital context, investors routinely sit
on the board in order to monitor and protect their investments.
Part IV then explains how having a shareholder representative on the board
solves many of the problems that other proposed reforms do not. Part IV responds
to potential criticisms, chief among which is that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other
corporate reforms render further action unnecessary. The Article's response is that
regulators, like generals, always fight the last war. Sarbanes-Oxley, and the new
listing rules instituted by NASDAQ and the NYSE, prohibit Enron- and WorldComstyle problems, such as loans to corporate officers, off-balance sheet transactions, and
conflicts of interest in company auditors. None of these reforms contemplate
structural changes that will prevent new kinds of frauds in the future.
The Article concludes that it makes sense to let corporations, and therefore
the market, decide whether putting a shareholder on the board is desirable.
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I. Unwatched Watchers
A.

The Problem With Boards

The central problem in corporate law is the separation of ownership and
control. Shareholders are the owners of the corporation. For reasons of liquidity,
shareholder ownership is divided into small pieces that can be readily traded. This
division creates a class of owners too numerous to run the corporation efficiently.
The corporation is run by the owners' employees, the management of the
15

corporation.
Although a board of directors generally oversees a corporation, 16 it delegates
the day-to-day running of the business to the management. 17 The board's primary
responsibility, then, is to select the CEO and supervise the senior management of the
corporation.' 8 Ideally, board members are diligent in fulfilling their duties to the
corporation and the shareholders they serve. They should maintain an attitude of
"constructive skepticism" to the information and recommendations management
presents, asking "incisive, probing questions" requiring "honest answers." 19 They
should be watchful not only for outright fraud, but also for inadvisable management
decisions that would harm the corporation.
Unfortunately, such model director behavior seems to have been honored
more in the breach than in the observance. Although the board's primary duty may
be to select the CEO, such selection occurs only every few years, or even decades. In
practice the CEO has often served longer than many members of the board, and was
in fact the very person that procured them their seats. 20 Board members are
15George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,
1989 Wis. L. REv. 881, 881 (1989) (calling the separation of ownership and control "corporate
law's central dilemma").
16DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2003) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors [subject to certain exceptions]."); AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/
at
(2003),
10
RESPONSIBILITY
CORPORATE
corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf (March 31, 2003) [hereinafter REPORT OF ABA TASK
FORCE].
17Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
1, 4 n.9 (2002).
18 THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE iii,

REV

1 (2002), at

http://www.brtable.org/document.cfii704; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jessie M. Fried & David I.
Walker, ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CF-.
L. REv. 751, 767 (2002). The Business Roundtable, an association of CEOs, singles out the
selection, determination of compensation, and evaluation of the CEO as the most important
function of the board. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra, at 3.
19THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 18, at 3.
20 Lori B. Marino, Executive Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on Increasing
ShareholderAccess to the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1205, 1211 n.42, 1212 (1999).
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frequently CEOs themselves with several concurrent board seats, and they have
failed to devote enough time and attention to monitoring, instead tending to defer to
management decisions. 2' As a structural matter, board members depend on
management as their sole source of information. 22
Even outside directors are often under the influence of management,
despite nominally working for shareholders. 23 Overall, a "culture of passivity"
prevails in many corporations, with management free from "meaningful director
oversight."24 In WorldCom, the largest bankruptcy in American history, Bernard
Ebbers (WorldCom's then-CEO) "was allowed nearly imperial reign over the affairs
of the company, without the board of directors exercising any apparent restraint on
his actions, even though he did not appear to possess the experience or training to be
remotely qualified for his position." 25
To make matters worse, aside from structural impediments to board
functioning, conflicts of interest contribute to making outside directors independent
in name only. In the past, service providers such as lawyers, bankers, and
accountants have served as "outside" directors despite being "only nominally
independent," because of their dependence on the goodwill of the CEO for
business.26 Although the new rules prevent these specific relationships, 27 they do not
preclude all conflicts of interest. For example, nonprofit leaders can sit on boards of
companies that donate substantial sums to the very nonprofits they head. This
creates "the possibility that money flowing from companies and their executives will
make nonprofit officials beholden to the corporate management they are supposed
to monitor." 28 Even if new rules correct this problem, no rules can encompass all
potential conflicts of interest. The web of obligations owed and loyalties felt at some
point becomes too difficult to trace.

21ABA

FINAL REPORT, supranote 5, at 9.

22REPORT OF ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 16; ABA FINAL
Bebchuk, supranote 18, at 772; Dent, supra note 15, at 898.

REPORT,

supra note 5, at 9;

23ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10; Dent, supra note 15, at 898.
24

ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10; Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the

Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 77, 78 n.253 (1990) (describing the Mace study, which
found that traditionally selected outside directors tend to be passive).
2 Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust: Report to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, 2 (Aug.
2003).
2 Dent, supra note 15, at 898.
27
NASDAQ now requires that independent directors receive no more than $60,000 in
other compensation from the corporation. NASD Manual Online, supra note 9.
28David Bank & Joann S. Lublin, On Corporate Boards, Officials from Nonprofits Spark
Concern, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2003, at Al.
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Another complication is that supposedly independent directors share social
connections with management. 29 In the case of WorldCom, many nominally
independent directors "had been associated with [the CEO] for years, and some
owed most of their personal net worth to his actions."30 Independent directors are
selected by inside directors: Personal or professional relationships can create bias,
even if not outright conflict of interest.31 The CEO often serves on the nominating
committee or exerts his influence on it, even if he does not formally serve. 32 Because
of the CEO's close relationship with board members, he has the power either to expel
a director who opposes him, or not renew his directorship.33
There is a strong correlation between director compensation and CEO
compensation. Because boards are largely composed of CEOs, they are interested in
raising CEO pay levels in general.34 Many compensation committee members may
be personal friends of the CEO. 35 For example, two directors who were "longtime
associates" of WorldCom CEO Ebbers arranged for $400 million in "loans" to Ebbers
from the company. 36 In short, management often controls the board.37
Boards inherently function as groups, and both benign and malign theories
exist about what that means. According to the "benign theory," the fact that the
board of directors is a group means that its members monitor each other and
encourage improvement. Members strive to comport with communal norms, and
face reputational and social sanctions when they do not.38 Board members seek their
positions for financial reasons, yes, but also for learning and networking
opportunities.
In contrast, there is the "malign theory" of board functionality, which may
ring more true given the revelations of corporate misconduct in the late nineties.
According to one description:
Boards are frequently constrained by what one director
has called the "cult of politeness."
Another knowledgeable
29 K.A.D. Camara, Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law
10 (Dec. 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Journal of Law, Business &
Finance), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract411480.
30Breeden, supra note 25, at 31.
31Arthur R. Pinto, Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations,46 AM. J.
CoM. L. 317, 346 (1998).
32
Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 766-67.
33Id.at 770.
34Id. at 768-69; Marino, supra note 20, at 1211-12.
35
Marino, supra note 21, at 1211 n.42.
36Breeden, supra note 25, at 2, 28 n.27.
37
Camara, supra note 29, at 10.
38
Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 28.
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commentator has described "a subtle set of unspoken norms"
which inhibit robust discourse within the confines of the
boardroom.... [Miany directors suppress their concerns in board
meetings for fear of appearing disrespectful of the CEO or of
9
indicating a vote of "no confidence."3

According to this version, board members serve on boards because of the prestige or
business relationships.40 These factors can result in a constitutional reluctance to
challenge management.
In the worst cases, management control is concentrated in senior executives,
whose motives are to maximize their own wealth by reporting the good news to the
board, while concealing the bad news.41 Stock-based compensation, particularly
compensation based on short-term options, arguably gives insiders incentives to
manipulate operations, or earnings alone, to reap large short-run payoffs by selling
before the market adjusts.42
The problem of boards being too closely tied to management is compounded
by boards' tendency to be static and self-perpetuating. As the next section discusses,
it is extremely difficult for shareholders to alter the composition of the board.
B.

The Inability of Shareholders To Effect Change

Currently shareholders have little real power to effect change in the
governance of the corporations they own. The board controls the proxy process.
The shareholder proposal rule allows shareholders to submit proposals for
shareholder vote, but because of subject matter limitations, shareholders cannot use
the rule to nominate their own candidates. The SEC has promulgated rules that
make the procedures of nominating committees more transparent, but they stop
short of requiring that the committees actually accept any shareholder-proposed
candidates for the board (the SEC's proposed rules on this topic will be discussed in
Part II). Proxy contests currently represent the only mechanism for shareholders

39

Barnard, supra note 24, at 77 (internal notes omitted).
75; Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 770.
41ABA FINAL REPORT, supranote 5, at 6.
42 Ribstein, supra note 1, at 15.
This problem was magnified in the case of
WorldCom's loans to Ebbers, which were secured with his own WorldCom stock. There, the
decline of WorldCom's stock price
put Ebbers under enormous pressure to stave off margin calls, since they
could have led to a forced liquidation of his holdings and potentially to a
personal bankruptcy filing. Literally anything that would increase the price
of WorldCom stock or slow its rate of decline, such as strong reported
earnings, would help relieve the intense financial pressure on Ebbers.
Breeden, supra note 25, at 27.
40Id. at
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seeking to change the composition of the board, but these are prohibitively
expensive and launched only when takeover of the corporation is sought.
Corporate elections work as follows: A corporation sends out materials to its
shareholders each year in advance of annual elections. These materials generally
ask shareholders to give the management their proxy vote, and hence are called
proxy materials. Although shareholders do elect board members, in practice the
proxy process strips this power of significance, except in the rare case of a proxy
contest. The relationship between the shareholders and the board is not legally that
of principal and agent, 43 and the shareholders do not control the actions of the
board. 44 The board selects the slate of candidates listed in the proxy materials, with
little shareholder input.
The proxy process is in reality a mere formality, little more than a rubber
stamp of the board's selection.45 Most corporations do not permit cumulative voting,
which would allow shareholders to cast all of their votes for one candidate. Plurality
voting, the default in Delaware,46 permits candidates with less than fifty percent of
the vote to win.47 This means that even if a significant portion of the shareholder
electorate casts no-confidence or "withhold votes," the board candidates still win.48
It is no wonder investors often view corporate elections as a "rigged process." 49
Because shareholders cannot choose their representative overseers, the resulting
problem is: Who will watch the watchers? 0
Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule, is meant to increase
management's accountability to shareholders,51 but several SEC limitations render
this right largely ineffective as a means of replacing directors. This rule allows
shareholders with $2,000 invested in the company, or a one percent ownership
interest, to offer a resolution for shareholder approval, as long as it does not pertain to
elections.52 Even these resolutions are generally precatory, i.e., they must suggest a

43For

further discussion of the agency analogy, see Camara, supranote 29, at 47-48.
supranote 31, at 324.
45STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 12.
46DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2003).
47STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 12 n.25 ("Under plurality voting, the candidate with
the greatest number of votes is elected; therefore, in an election in which there are the same
number of nominees as there are board positions open, all nominees will be elected.").
48Id.at 12.
49Phyllis Plitch, SEC's DirectorNomination ProposalDivides Cos, Investors, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 22, 2003.
50Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 23.
s1Christine L. Ayotte, Comment, Reevaluating the Shareholder ProposalRule in the Wake
of Cracker Barrel and the Era of InstitutionalInvestors, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 511, 512 (1999).
52 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2003).
44Pinto,
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result, not require it.53 If a shareholder wants a specific policy change, she has no
means to require the board to adopt that change, even if the vast majority of
shareholders vote for it. Although the number of shareholder resolutions has
increased,54 shareholders cannot use the rule to replace inadequate directors because
the rule excludes resolutions dealing with elections. A shareholder unhappy with
the performance of an individual board member, or even the board as a whole,
possesses two choices: sell her shares (the so-called "Wall Street Rule"55) or launch a
proxy contest for control of the company.
Proxy contests are prohibitively expensive for a shareholder who seeks to
reconfigure the board, rather than replace it.56 Insurgents must pay their own costs
and campaign without the backing of the corporation. 57
Furthermore, the
management that controls the board also controls the proxy process. Shareholders
are unlikely to invest the time in investigating the pros and cons of any insurgent
slate due to their passivity or "rational apathy": because any individual shareholder
will only see a fractional return (proportionate to the size of her individual equity
holding) on any investigation in information that she makes, she is unlikely to
investigate in the first place. If a shareholder does take the time and money to make
the correct choice, she knows that she will be forced to share the benefits should her
position carry the day.58 Shareholders' power to replace directors is therefore no
more than a myth.59 Derivative suits, where a shareholder brings suit on behalf of
the corporation, are also difficult and again require that the shareholder who invests
time and money to improve the board or governance of a corporation share any
gains achieved with her fellow shareholders.
If the corporation has a nominating committee, shareholders can make
suggestions for director candidates to that committee. Nominating committees have
historically been "black box" affairs, however, which are free to disregard
shareholder suggestions without explanation. Boards have a private interest in selfperpetuation, and a tendency to avoid the admission of failure that accepting a
nomination from a shareholder might entail.60 Furthermore, when the problem is
greatest (for example, when independent directors are falling down on the job and
53

supra note 8, at 8 n.20.
OF ABA TAsK FORCE, supra note 16, at 14.
5-Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 21. For a more detailed analysis of the workings of the
Wall Street Rule, see Camara, supra note 29, at 35.
56 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 5 (July, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-id426951 (Working Draft, July 2003).
5
7 Dent, supra note 15, at 903.
5 Id. at 903-04; Pinto, supra note 31, at 326.
5
9 Bebchuk, supra note 56, at 2.
STAFF REPORT,

54 REPORT

60Id. at 8.
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the board has been captured by management), shareholders cannot trust the
nominating committee. 61
The SEC has adopted rules that require a corporation to disclose whether it
has a standing nominating committee and, if not, a reason why it finds it appropriate
not to have one. 62 If a nominating committee does exist, corporations must disclose
the committee's charter (or state that it does not have one) and whether the directors
on the committee are independent.63
If the committee considers candidates
suggested by shareholders, the corporation must disclose how shareholders can
submit their suggestions, and the minimum qualifications and specific qualities or
skills the nominating committee is looking for in candidates.64 If a committee
receives a recommended nominee from a shareholder or group of shareholders that
has owned five percent or more of the company's common stock for at least a year,
and rejects that candidate, the committee must disclose the names of the
recommending shareholders and their rejected candidates (provided each
consents) .65
Logic indicates that this reform of the nominating process will not
significantly increase shareholder participation. The new rule will hopefully
motivate nominating committees to consider shareholder nominees more carefully.
But the nominating committees are still free to reject shareholder candidates without
explanation. As long as the nominating committee is not required to accept a
shareholder-recommended candidate, this rule lacks the teeth to shift the balance of
power in the shareholder nomination process away from the board.
Shareholders theoretically could nominate board candidates at a company's
annual meeting. In almost all cases, however, voting will have already been
accomplished by proxies distributed beforehand, so such a nomination would be
little more than an empty gesture. 66
The incumbents possess procedural
advantages-such as the holding of proxies and influence over nominations-that
virtually guarantee that they will win.67
According to former Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Court of Chancery,
the "ideological underpinning" for legitimacy of directorial power is the shareholder

Id.
Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications
Between Security Holders and Boards of Directors; Final Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 3448825 (Nov. 24,2003).
63
Id.
61
62

64Id.

6 Id.
66

STAFF REPoRT,

supra note 8, at 5.

Michael J. Whincop, The Role of the Shareholder in Corporate Governance, 25
L. REv. 418, 429 (2001).
67
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franchise.68 But several elements conspire to keep shareholders from exercising a
vote that has any real meaning:
* Shareholders effectively cannot nominate directors.
" Nominating committees have proven largely unresponsive to
shareholder-suggested candidates.
* Proxy contests do not present a viable alternative to the average
shareholder because of their expense.
" Shareholders are left with self-perpetuating boards sharing explicit
or covert ties to management.
* These directors generally lack the time or the motivation to
investigate management's decisions adequately.
The next section will describe the SEC's proposals to remedy this problem,
and then address why these proposals will fail.
II. A Failure in the Making: The SEC's Shareholder Proposal Reform
The perceived current crisis in corporate governance (or, at least, the
perception that boards were asleep at the helm during the excesses of the late
nineties boom) has prompted the SEC to propose reforms to the nomination process
designed to give shareholders greater access to the ballot, at least in certain
circumstances. This Part will first describe the proposed reforms, and then explain
why they likely will not prove effective at increasing real shareholder participation
in corporate governance and at best represent a needlessly convoluted and indirect
means of addressing a problem that direct shareholder representation neatly solves.
A.

The Proposal Described

The SEC Staff Report, released on July 15, 2003, discussed several
alternatives for reform that would allow shareholders to participate more directly in
the election of directors. 69 On October 14, 2003, the SEC proposed a rule regarding
director nominations by shareholders.70 The proposed rule would only apply to
companies permitted by state law to nominate candidates, and where a "triggering
event" has occurred. The SEC has proposed two such triggering events: (1) where at
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
These included two proposals for allowing shareholders the opportunity to add
their own content to the proxy materials that a corporation regularly sends to its shareholders,
a move that corporations have opposed in the past. Another proposal was to change or
interpret rule 14a-8(i)(8) (which currently lets companies exclude proposals relating to
elections) to permit resolutions seeking to allow shareholders access to the proxy card in a
non-control context. STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 28.
70 Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No.
34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm.
6

69

HeinOnline -- 9 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 265 2003-2004

Stanford Journalof Law, Business & Finance

Vol 2: 254

least one company-nominated director receives "withhold votes" totaling more than
thirty-five percent of the total votes cast; and (2) where a security holder or group of
security holders who have held more than one percent of the company's securities
for over one year submit a shareholder proposal subjecting the company to the
proposed shareholder nomination process, and that proposal receives more than
fifty percent of votes cast. 71
Once a triggering event has occurred, a company's proxy process is subject
to certain procedures. The company must notify its shareholders that it is now
subject to the SEC-prescribed security holder nomination procedures. Shareholders
or groups that have owned, individually or in the aggregate, more than five percent
of outstanding voting securities for at least two years, intend to own them until the
election date, and have certified that they are not holding the shares with the intent
of controlling the corporation, may submit eligible nominees.
To be eligible, a nominee must be independent both of the company and of
the security holders that nominate her. The rules prohibit relationships between the
nominee and the nominating security holder or group: The nominee may not be the
nominating security holder, a member of the nominating security holder's family, an
executive director or officer of the nominating security holder, or have accepted
consulting, advisory, or other fees from the nominating security holder for the past
two years. The SEC proposed this restriction to eliminate the possibility that
"'special interest' or 'single issue' directors would advance the interests of the
nominating security holder over the interests of security holders as a group." 7 2 The
proposed rules also prohibit relationships between these entities and the corporation
itself, in order to ensure that the nominee complies with all applicable standards
regarding directorial independence at the federal, state, and security exchange level.
B.

Problems with the Proposal

The major problem with the SEC's proposal is that it clings to the notion that
a perfectly independent director, one with no ties to the nominating shareholder, is
the ideal. 73 However, most of the directors serving during Bernard Ebbers' tenure at
71 Id. at 45. The SEC is considering a third triggering event similar to the second but
not limited in subject matter, where any shareholder proposal made by a qualifying
shareholder or group of shareholders that receives more than 50% of the votes cast, but is not
implemented by the company, would result in the right of shareholders to nominate directors.
Id. at 13-14.
72Proposed Rule, supra note 70.
73 This Article does not address the SEC's authority to adopt the rules it has
proposed. The Business Roundtable challenged this authority in its comments to the SEC. THE

BusINEss ROUNDTABLE, DETAILED CoMM*ENTs ON THE "PRoPoSED ELECTION CONTEST RULES" OF
THE
U.S.
SECURIIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(2003),
available
at

http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/brt122203.pdf.
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WorldCom qualified as independent.74 Independence alone does not motivate
directors to monitor diligently, and there is no reason to believe that shareholders
will be more effective at nominating diligent independent director candidates than
nominating committees have been in the past.
Commentators have voiced concerns that the kind of reforms the SEC has
proposed would cost corporations a great deal because incumbent directors would
be forced into contested elections. 75 Board directors might have to send mailings and
conduct road shows that would consume their time and the corporation's money in
order to defend their seats. 76 Others fear that the prospect of contested elections,
coupled with the recent decline in the coverage of director and officer insurance,
would deter individuals from serving on boards at all. 77
Other potential problems have to do with the character and qualifications of
the shareholder nominees and their impact on the board. Because shareholders do
not have a duty to act in the corporation's best interest when selecting candidates (as
boards do), the nominees might not adequately represent all shareholders. 78 Or the
candidates that shareholders suggest may simply be unqualified to serve on the
board. 79 Finally, there is the objection that the introduction of shareholdernominated board members would "alter the dynamics of the board,"80 and balkanize
it.81 A polarized board could well find itself unable to function effectively because it
would not be able to agree on anything.
As the criticisms of the SEC's proposal make clear, the solution it offers is a
complicated one at best. I offer a different solution: Rather than empower the
owners to nominate a member of the board that will watch their assets, simply put
an owner on the board itself. The problems of contested elections and the identity
and qualification of candidates are thus avoided. The next Part describes the
mechanics of how this solution would work.

74

Breeden, supra note 25, at 30.
costs include higher campaign costs for incumbent directors, multiplication
of decision costs among shareholders, and "external diseconomies of incorrect voting caused
by inadequate incentives to investigate." Camara, supra note 29, at 47; see also STAFF REPORT,
supra note 9, at 12; Barnard, supra note 24, at 75.
76
Bebchuk, supra note 56, at 9.
77STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 12; Lucian Bebchuk, ed., Symposium on Corporate
Elections (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Journal of Law, Business &
Finance)
(quoting
Martin
Lipton),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/corporate-govemance/papers/01inSymposium-Corporate-Elections.pdf.
75Overall

78STAFF REPORT, supra note 8.
79Bebchuk, supra note 56, at 13.
80Staff Report, supra note 8, at 12.
81Bebhuk, supra note 56, at 15.
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III. Letting the Money Govern
A.

The Solution Described

The solution I propose is a simple one. On the record date,82 a corporation
would tally up its stock ownership and compile a list of shareholders in order of the
size of their holdings, from greatest to least. Any person deemed not independent
by virtue of ties to management or the current board (but not an "affiliate" if so
categorized solely by virtue of holding size)83 is removed from the list. The
shareholder at the top of this list is then offered a seat on the board. If that
shareholder refuses, the offer is made to the next shareholder on the list, and so on.
Shareholders would not be permitted to aggregate their shares, because to do so
would defeat the purpose of ensuring that the person serving on the board is highly
84
motivated to monitor management on behalf of her investment.
Plurality voting and the proxy process ensure that nomination is de facto
election in the world of corporate voting. 85 The easiest way for a corporation to
implement this Article's proposal would be for its board to adopt the abovedescribed process as a means of selecting one of its board candidates. Boards of
companies needing a strong signal of trustworthiness, like those emerging from
corporate scandal, might well take this action. If it wishes, the board could
legitimize its action by proposing it for shareholder vote. An alternative method of
allowing this result (for Delaware corporations) would be for Delaware to adopt a
law that corporations could propose an amendment to their charters requiring that
one seat be set aside for a shareholder-director.86

82 The record date is the date for determining which shareholders are entitled to vote
at an annual meeting, fixed according to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (2003). Any date may, of
course, be used, but the record date seems most convenient because it is already defined by
the Delaware Code and by a corporation's articles of incorporation.
83 See Reg. S-K, Item 404, 17 C.F.R. 229.404 (2003).
84 Aggregation would also be unhelpful to the extent that a large equity holding is a
proxy for financial sophistication. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
85See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
86 This Article contemplates reform on the level of state corporate law. It analyzes
this problem in the framework of Delaware law, which is the frequent state of choice for
corporations to incorporate. This is largely presumed to be because its well-developed case
law and sophisticated judiciary make it attractive to corporations seeking to maximize the
certainty of the legal rules that form the backdrop against which they operate. See, e.g., Curtis

Alva, Delaware and the Market for CorporateCharters:History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885,

918 (1990) (arguing that specialized judiciary makes Delaware incorporation more attractive);
Stephen J. Massey, ChancellorAllen's Jurisprudence and the Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J.

CoRP. L. 683, 702 n.79 (1992) (describing scholars' reliance on Delaware case law as an
explanation for its competitive success).
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Adoption would be voluntary. The corporations who do adopt the proposal
will likely be ones with low stock prices and a history of defrauding investors, i.e.,
companies perceived to have "captive boards" and those emerging from corporate
scandals, eager to cleanse themselves of the taint of the past. Companies like
WorldCom and Tyco might well be eager to signal to investors that they have
nothing to hide from shareholders.
Certain actions could precipitate the more widespread adoption of the
proposal. Organizations like Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc. ("ISS") and
Standard & Poor's Corporation rate corporations on their corporate governance
(and, for a fee, advise companies on how to improve their scores).87 If ISS and other
rating institutions assign a large plus factor to corporations that adopt such a
measure, then corporations outside of the limited set tainted by corporate scandal
may adopt the reform. Having a shareholder-director could become another
element of corporate governance "best practices."
Will any shareholders take the job when it is offered? There are two ways for
corporations to structure the process, depending on whether one believes that
shareholders will want to sit on the board without any extra inducement, or whether
they need additional motivation. If shareholders in general want to serve on boards,
then the corporation could make them assume the risk of noncompliance with
insider trading laws (perhaps implementing a 10b-5(1) plan of predetermined stock
sales) or require a trading standstill while on the board and a given number of days
thereafter.
A more equitable solution, and one that more closely mimics the venture
capital firm model discussed in the next section, rewards the shareholder-director for
her service, and compensates her for the diminished liquidity she suffers during her
time in office, by granting her additional restricted stock. The shareholder-director
would not be able to sell this restricted stock until a specified time after leaving the
board. The restrictions, unlike stock options, would discourage the shareholderdirector from seeking short-term gain in stock price in order to profit before the stock
fell. Because of this built-in delayed liquidity, she will make decisions that maximize
long-term corporate gain. If it seems that shareholders are reluctant to take the job
because of the potential liability or illiquidity, the prospect of restricted stock might
persuade them.8
87

Monica Langley, Want to Lift Your Firm's Rating on Governance? Buy the Test,

WALL

ST. J, June 6, 2003, at Al.

8 This Article presumes that the goal of corporations is to reward the long-term
investor. THE BuSINEsS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 18, at 25. This assumption would help deter
fraud, because if the managers of a corporation are focused on long-term growth, then they
will not engage in fraudulent conduct to create illusory short term gains in stock price. The
move away from stock options and toward restricted stock grants, most notably made
recently by Microsoft, is in part attributable to this concern. Julie Howard, Will Companies
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Insider trading concerns could present another area of concern for
prospective shareholder-directors with stakes in other companies. Exposure to
liability for trading in the stock of these other companies on information gained
while serving as a director could be severe. Section lOb-5(1) plans, where
individuals provide preset directions to their brokers on when to buy and sell,
represent one solution.89 Of course, this problem is not unique to the shareholderdirector: Directors chosen in the traditional manner deal with insider trading
concerns, often exacerbated by their service on multiple corporate boards, every day.
The current reasons individuals choose to serve on boards are reputation,
networking, and professional gain. These all can prove dangerous because they can
clash with the interests of the shareholders. Some corporations attempt to correct for
this by granting directors stock options to try to align their interests with those of the
shareholders.90 This is an artificial solution to a problem more easily solved by

Follow Microsoft's Lead in Dumping Stock Options?, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 21, 2003, at Business
1. (The other reason for granting restricted stock is because of the controversy surrounding
companies' ability to issue stock options without expensing them). If the shareholder-director

is granted restricted stock, then the assumption of a long-term investor harmonizes her
incentives with those of the other shareholders. Without this presumption, incentives would
be misaligned, because investors would be looking for short-term gains in stock value, to
which the long-term-biased shareholder director would be indifferent.

The presumption also removes from consideration the preferences of investors who might
favor short-term run-ups in stock value caused by fraud. The point may be an obvious one,
but if investors generally were indifferent to, or even favored, fraudulent practices to the
extent that they represent opportunities to "time the market" and sell at a profit before the
fraud was discovered, then corporate fraud would not present a problem. These investors
may exist, but for public policy reasons securities regulators should not consider their
interests when framing rules, and neither should corporations.
89 These plans establish an affirmative defense for individuals who trade despite
having material nonpublic information provided that:
(A) Before becoming aware of the [material nonpublic] information, the
person had: (1) Entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the
security, (2) Instructed another person to purchase or sell the security for the
instructing person's account, or (3) Adopted a written plan for trading
securities;
(B) The contract, instruction or plan . . .: (1) Specified the amount of
securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the date on
which the securities were to be purchased or sold; (2) Included a written
formula or algorithm, or computer program, for determining the amount of

securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the date on
which the securities were to be purchased or sold; or (3) Did not permit the
person to exercise any subsequent influence . . .provided [the person was
not] aware of the material nonpublic information... ; or
(C) The purchase or sale that occurred was in fact pursuant to the contract,
instruction or plan.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1)(c) (2003).
90Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 769.
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giving a shareholder who already has the incentive to maximize his or her own
value a seat on the board.
B.

The Venture Capitalist Model

Although the reuniting of ownership and control might seem revolutionary,
this model already exists in the world of privately-held companies. Indeed, it is the
norm among companies backed by venture capitalist firms. These firms pool the
money of sophisticated investors who invest in companies that are still private, and
obtain a return on their investment when the company is acquired or goes public.91
Venture capitalist firms structure transactions to retain control of the board,92 and
venture capitalists and founders generally constitute the boards of startups. 93
Venture capitalists use board representation and voting control to manage or
withdraw investments by liquidation, financing, or forced sale.94
One could perhaps object that recent failures of venture funds do not inspire
faith that theirs is a model worthy of emulation. But securities regulation does not
promise that every corporation has a board that will lead it to profitability and yield
its shareholders commensurate returns on their investment. The rationale behind
regulation is instead to ensure that the market has complete and reliable information
so that investors can make their own conclusions as to the worth of the companies
whose stock they buy.95 This Article's proposal should lead to wealth maximization
because complete disclosure gives a shareholder reliable information. Armed with
full knowledge, he can assess the risks and prospective returns of investment options
accurately, and build a diversified portfolio accordingly. There will always be
venture capital funds (just as there will always be companies) that pursue high risk
ventures and fail, particularly in economic downturns. As long as investors have an
accurate picture of the risks, and can rely on the information they are given, the
failure of venture capitalist funds is not a sign of a malfunctioning system. 96

91 Shannon Wells Stevenson, Note, The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close
CorporationShareholderFiduciaryDuties, 51 DuICE L.J. 1139, 1140 n.13 (2001).
92 Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory
of Venture-Capital-FinancedFirms, 2002 WIs. L. REv. 52, 61-62 (2002).
93 G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein & Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L.
REv. 887, 896 (2000).
94 George G. Triantis, Review: FinancialContract Design in the World of Venture Capital,
68 U. Cm. L. REv. 305, 314 (2001).
9- This Article embraces the principle that the goal of corporate law is shareholder
wealth maximization, and not consideration for stakeholders such as members of the
community or employees.
9 This Article stresses the fraud-fighting effect of installing a shareholder-director
because that seems the most immediately obvious benefit. Shareholder-directors could also
enhance shareholder wealth by making affirmatively profitable board decisions, and their bias
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Of course, the venture capitalist-funded firm is not an exact analog for
public corporations. Venture capitalists make a large upfront commitment to a longterm investment, accepting less liquidity than if they were to invest in a public
company. Their gain is a bigger upside than the common shareholder's: Venture
capitalists receive dividends first and are paid first when the company liquidates.
Also, there is less scrutiny of the board because the corporation is privately held. But
the venture capitalist model does suggest that there might be a place for a motivated
owner on the board of a corporation.
C.

Advantages over the SEC Proposal

The chief advantage of this Article's proposal is that it effects a structural
change by introducing a new actor to the corporate governance arena, one uniquely
motivated to monitor both management and his or her fellow directors. The SEC's
proposed reforms, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, accept the separation of ownership
and control as a fixed feature of the corporate landscape, and attempt to increase
independence and shareholder participation in the proxy process. But adherence to
"best practices" and definitions of "independence" are no guarantee of good
governance: "At least 80% of WorldCom's directors during the Ebbers era would
probably meet today's standards for director independence, as well as the standards
of the time."97
Another major advantage of this Article's proposal over the SEC's solution is
that it can be implemented quickly and inexpensively. Rather than waiting for the
lengthy process of SEC rulemaking and then for the rule's triggering events to occur,
corporations wishing to signal their commitment to corporate governance can take
the easy step of nominating their largest shareholder to the board at the next annual
election.
Furthermore, many of the criticisms leveled against the SEC's proposed
reform do not apply to this proposal. First, there would be no contested election; one
seat would simply be designated for the largest independent shareholder willing to
serve. The other traditionally elected directors would not face the stress of
campaigning to defend their seats, and companies would be spared those costs.
A second criticism made of the SEC's proposal is that the nominees might be
loyal to their nominator, and not serve the interests of the shareholders at large.
This proposal is vulnerable to a similar criticism, because the shareholder-director
could have personal reasons for advocating a given transaction or position, and be
able to profit on her position at the expense of the other shareholders. To the extent
towards the long-term would certainly help focus corporate energies on creating sustainable
revenues.
97
Breeden, supra note 25, at 30.
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a shareholder-director has an interest in a transaction as a shareholder,this interest is
beneficial because, in maximizing the value of his own shares, he will be maximizing
the value of the shares of all other shareholders. But if the shareholder-director had
a financial interest in a transaction that he did not share with all other shareholders,
then the interest presents a problem because if he were to act to maximize his
interest (as presumably he would, unconstrained by law), that action would not
benefit the other shareholders.
The first response to this criticism is that it explains why the optimal number
of shareholder-directors is one. To the extent that the shareholder-director is not
beholden to the CEO or management for her seat, she will be less likely to defer to
their opinions. Said more positively, one diligent director encourages others,98 who
will work knowing that an owner is looking over their shoulders. But one board
member, acting alone, is relatively unlikely to persuade the board to take action that
is not in the interest of the corporation as a whole. One may actually be the optimal
number, because it is enough to police the rest of the board, and motivate it to act
responsibly. At the same time, one director is relatively unlikely to sway the board
towards an agenda that the rest of the shareholders do not benefit from, thus
minimizing the danger that, fiduciary duties notwithstanding, a faction could sway
the board for its own interests.
Secondly, the danger of a director acting to advance personal interests rather
than those of the shareholders exists for every director, and Delaware has a welldeveloped body of law to deal with the situation. A director's duty of loyalty to
shareholders as their fiduciary would forbid her from capitalizing on the
opportunity for private gain. A director is well-advised to disclose any private
interest in a transaction the board is contemplating, and either abstain from voting or
obtain shareholder ratification.99 The shareholder-director would not be exempt
from the fiduciary duties a director owes the corporation. For example, if the board
was considering outsourcing a large portion of its business to a corporation in which
the shareholder-director had a sizeable stake, she would be obliged to disclose this
fact and abstain from voting, just as any traditionally selected director would.
In fairness, the SEC's reform proposal can be defended against the criticism
that shareholder nominees will be loyal to their nominator on the same grounds:
Fiduciary duties apply. However, making the shareholder a board member does
solve a problem with reform proposals that would make shareholder resolutions
binding. Shareholders making resolutions have no freestanding duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation. A shareholder with an interest in another entity
9

Barnard, supra note 24, at 78.
99 If a director discloses the material facts of the relationship or interest and a majority
of disinterested directors or the shareholders approves the transaction, it is not void or
voidable due solely to a director's financial interest. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2003).
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might propose to acquire that entity for self-serving reasons that have little to do
with the best interests of the acquirer corporation. 100 Such a shareholder would be
unconstrained by fiduciary duties. Making the shareholder representative a board
member introduces the useful corrective of fiduciary duties to ensure that the
shareholder-director acts primarily as a shareholder of the company in question.
Theoretically, the criticism that the SEC's proposal could lead to unqualified
nominees could also apply to this proposal. Lucian Bebchuk has rightly labeled this
view as "paternalistic."01 An investor with a large enough investment to qualify for
a directorship under the proposal would be sophisticated enough to monitor
management. Although the shareholder-director may not have expertise in the
company's specific industry, or have the knowledge to qualify as a financial expert,
other board members can and will.102
The fourth criticism leveled at the SEC's reform proposal is that it will
balkanize the board. To the extent that such balkanization is caused by the rancor
and acrimony stirred up by contested elections, this proposal will hopefully avoid
the problem. In the limited set of companies expected to adopt the proposal (those
emerging from scandal), incumbents are likely to be newly installed and more
receptive to new membership. This is not to discount the criticism completely;
shareholders presumably want boards to function fairly well and not deadlock at
every turn. But these critics should remember recent problems with "rubber stamp"
boards, and accept that "constructive skepticism" may lead to disagreements on the
road to resolution.
IV. Four Criticisms and Four Responses
This Part responds to potential criticisms of the proposed solution. The best
response to all of these criticisms may be that because of its voluntary nature, it will
likely do no harm to offer the opportunity for corporations to signal their exemplary
corporate governance if they choose to.

100 Camara, supra note 29, at 40.
101Bebchuk, supra note 56, at 15.
102 For the purposes of private investments, the SEC presumes investor sophistication
where an investor has an individual net worth greater than $1 million in net worth, or income
exceeding $200,000 for the past two years. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2003). Although the position
of director of a public company is qualitatively different from that of an investor in a private
company, if companies have concerns about the qualifications of potential shareholder
directors, they can establish similar floors.
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It Is Not Necessary

The most obvious response to this proposal is that it is unnecessary. Several
forces work together to police director behavior. Shareholders can vote directors out
annually. Directors who breach their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty risk
liability in court. Underperforming directors cause the products companies make to
fail relative to more efficiently run companies, with correspondingly better
products.103 Similarly, companies with sub par directors will fare worse in the
capital markets.104 Most notably, the extent and advisability of the "market for
corporate control" have for twenty years been the subject of scholarly debate.
Proponents of this view argue that boards that do not monitor management
adequately will cause their companies to lose money, the stock price to sink, and the
board to face takeover by a corporation that can make better use of its resources. 105
Some even question whether the shareholder vote is, or ought to be, of any
significance at all. One critic writes: "Seventy years ago it was fashionable among
intellectuals to talk about large, publicly held corporations as if they were little
republics."16 He derides this thinking as coming from an "intellectual time warp,"
arguing that corporate democracy "never made any sense." 10 7 "Management and the
board are constituent parts of a team that runs a corporation. Each monitors the
other, and reciprocity in their selection is precisely what we should expect in a well
run company." 108
The problem, as Enron et al. demonstrate, is that companies are not always
well run, and so the constituent parts of a corporation do not always monitor each
other. Investors need to be able to rely on the information companies disclose in
order to determine if they are investing in well-run companies. It seems logical,
then, to give companies the chance to signal their reliability by putting a shareholder
on the board.
Moreover, as many commentators have observed, the market for corporate
control is hardly an efficient one.109 State antitakeover laws form one barrier to
efficiency.110 Boards are allowed to enact many antitakeover measures to ensure that
103 Bebchuk, supra note 18, at 778.
104 Id.

105 Id. at 777. The extent to which antitakeover measures have hampered or the
market for corporate control remains the subject of debate. See Camara, supra note 29, at 4-5.
106 Henry G. Manne, Citizen Donaldson, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2003, at A10.
07

1

Id.

108 Id.

109 Barnard, supra note 24, at 85; Carole Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing
ShareholderParticipationin Corporate Governance: Too Little, but Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L. REV.
379, 446-47 (1994).
110 Barnard, supra note 24, at 85.
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any hostile bidder will need the board's consent to succeed. Poison pills make it
mechanically impossible for a hostile bidder to gain control by buying up shares
without the board's consent, and classified boards limit the number of directors a
successful bidder can vote into office in a single year.",
Like the market for
corporate control, capital markets may not provide the disciplining mechanism
advocates of the status quo believe: "Capital markets discipline managers only when
they need outside funds. Most companies can survive and even grow with
internally generated capital."112
Certainly companies can only inflate and manufacture revenue for so long
before the exigencies of reality become too great and the true value of the company
However, the numbers are manipulable.113
and its stock becomes clear.
HealthSouth's management, incredibly, talked about having to find "dirt" to "fill the
holes" in their financial reports, to disguise the true health of the business. Some
investors (those in Enron and WorldCom come to mind) inevitably will be left with
large losses prior to the inevitable correction of the marketplace.
Even in cases where no fraud exists, shareholder-directors will increase
disclosure so that investors can make better assessments of the worth of the stock.
Shareholder-directors would particularly focus on long-term value-maximizing and
could encourage companies to better uses of existing resources, thus helping to
maximize value for shareholders.
A possible, but easily dismissible, response to this argument is that investors
should take into account that the numbers on which they base their investment
decisions may be untrustworthy and allocate risk accordingly. They should be
skeptical of financial results, especially in the face of meteorically rising rates of
return. But the market as a whole will function more efficiently if investors can trust
the numbers companies report, and allocate the risks and potential rewards of their
portfolio against a background of reliable information without having to hedge
against the risk of corporate fraud.
A related argument is that the proposal is unnecessary because institutional
investors already protect shareholders' interests. Theoretically these investors could
monitor corporations, if they owned large blocks and had an incentive to develop
specialized expertise in making and monitoring investments."1 But large blocks are
rare, and few funds hold more than five to ten percent of any one company's stock.
Pension funds specifically are limited by political and geographic pressures that

Camara, supranote 29, at 5 n12.
112 Dent, supra note 15, at 887.
113 Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 22; Pinto, supra note 31, at 330.
114 Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 93.
"I
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constrain their investments."15
Furthermore, hostility towards institutional
shareholders exists in corporate governance because of their perceived "shorttermism," although the validity of this charge remains in question." 6 Finally, recent
mutual fund scandals involving market timing and late trading indicate that
institutional investors may not even be protecting their own shareholders'
interests,",7 and therefore might prove unfit monitors of the companies in which they
invest.

B.

Interests of Large and Small Shareholders May Diverge

The SEC Staff Report asks: "Do large and small shareholders share the same
interests? If not, how do they differ and how would each be served under a
shareholder access rule?"" 8 The question is highly relevant for the model I propose
because, if the interests of small and large shareholders do diverge, then we cannot
trust large shareholders, even those genuinely independent of management, to
represent shareholders as a class and protect their interests."1 9
Large institutional investors, particularly pension funds, can less easily sell
their large holdings on the open market. They must therefore take more of a longrange view than individual investors, who have more liquidity. Some disagree with
this analysis, and believe that institutional investors are interested in short-term
results.20 Index funds in particular cannot liquidate their holdings, and their

"1 Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance, 93 COLLtM.
L. REv. 795, 806-07 (1993).
116 The argument is that institutional investment managers have an interest in
reporting good results and may not scrutinize the validity of short-term stock price
performance, if it is positive. REPORT OF ABA TASK FORCE, supranote 16, at 14; see also Barnard,
supra note 24, at 41.
7
11
Tom Lauricella, Scandal Reaches Far and High, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2004, at R1.
118STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
9
11
One could argue that having large shareholders' interests represented, even if they

diverge from those of small shareholders, signifies an improvement over the status quo (i.e.,
something is better than nothing). But if institutional investors already have the clout to
protect their interests, there is no need to offer them another means to assert themselves. How
much power institutional investors actually have is unclear. For example, pressure from state
pensions fund leaders forced Dick Grasso from his position as head of the NYSE (although
this is a private non-profit, and not a public corporation). Ben White, Pension Fund Officials
Seek NYSE Split, WAsH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at El. On the other hand, numerous institutional
investors submitted shareholder resolutions to limit executive compensation packages, but

none of the companies adopted them. Tamara Loomis, Shareholder Activism Seen In Proxy
Proposals, N.Y.L.J., June 17, 2003.
120 Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Ci. L. REv. 187, 203 (1991). ("The ascendancy of the
institutional stockholder . . . creates an emphasis on short-term results that makes it
increasingly difficult for the corporation to maintain the long-term focus necessary to its own
and society's well-being.").
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managers are more likely to take an active role in the corporate governance of the
companies in which they invest.121 When quick sale is difficult, exerting influence on
a company can offer an easier path to higher returns on an investment. 22
A related criticism of the proposal is that the institutional investors that
would be first in line to accept the shareholder's spot on the board are part of the
same "club" as current board management. The head of a pension fund or the
manager of a mutual fund might not adequately guard shareholder interests, not
because of interests divergent from those of small shareholders, but because of
conflicting motives to maintain their reputation in the larger business community.
Recent settlements suggest that mutual funds are willing to put their own
interests ahead of investors.123 If this is the case, they will not prove trustworthy
monitors for the shareholders. This risk may well be discounted, however, because
the insider trading problem would likely discourage most institutional investors
from accepting a board position. They would, of course, be free to assume the risk of
liability and construct adequate internal screens to wall off their board representative
and ensure that no information is conveyed to the fund's decision makers.
But institutional investors have historically tended to be passive.124 Their
response to the PSLRA's reform was to avoid, not embrace, the role of lead
plaintiff.125
Different reasons are offered for this: desire to maintain valuable
relationships with the company or fear of the responsibilities lead plaintiff status
entails.26 Implementing the proposal may pose too many practical problems for
institutional shareholders. To avoid insider trading violations, they would be forced
to develop ethical walls that prevent their directors from communicating inside
information to others within the institution. These same fears, coupled with the
danger of increased liability from insider trading, may keep institutional investors
from accepting the job of shareholder board representative.

Romano, supra note 115, at 833.
Pinto, supra note 31, at 344.
123 Lauricella, supra note 117, at R1; Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella, Spitzer Alleges
Mutual Funds Allowed Fraudulent Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at Al (involving mutual
funds that permitted a hedge fund manager to trade after hours and engage in "timing
trades").
124 Bebchuk, supra note 56, at 7.
125 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class Actions: Ethical
Dilemmas, 22 REv. LITIG. 557 (2003) (describing the interaction between PSLRA and state ethics
rules); Samantha M. Cohen, Note, "Paying-to-Play" is the New Rule of the Game: A Practical
Implication of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 99 U. ILL. L. REv. 1331 (1999) ('It
seems that institutional investors are wary to accept the role of lead plaintiff, fearing that the
benefits associated with the status will be outweighed by the position's cost and adverse
consequences.").
126
Cohen, supra note 125.
121

122
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I propose that adoption of a shareholder-director be voluntary in order to
avoid imposing a universal reform that may not work at all. Indeed, implicit in this
Article's title is the acknowledgement that this proposal, if implemented, might have
as little success as did the PSLRA in achieving its goals of reform. Although
institutional investors have exhibited more interest in involving themselves in the
governing of the corporations they own, there is no way of knowing whether they
will wish to take a seat on the board, or whether private individual owners will wish
to do so. This is one reason for not mandating a rule of shareholder-directors, but
leaving it for corporations to decide.
C.

The Proposal Will Not Benefit Shareholders

It could be argued that the proposal will not maximize shareholder revenue.
The response, as discussed earlier in Part IV.B., is that although individual
shareholders may not benefit from the reform, overall shareholders will benefit
because of the gain in reliability of information. Disclosure, not wealth
maximization, is the premise underlying the securities laws.127 If the market
distrusts the information it receives, the value of the market as a whole declines.128
Imperfect information creates transaction costs. The gain in the reliability of the
information that the corporation discloses allows shareholders to balance their
portfolios based on accurate financial information.129
D.

This Is Not the Time

Some will argue that the reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley still need to be
digested.130 Desperate times, however, call for desperate measures. 131 This is the
only time this proposal could be implemented. A relatively narrow window
currently exists when public sentiment is behind initiatives for corporate reform, and
corporations are willing to adopt them. Reforms should be instituted now that will
restore the value and power of the board, so that when the next bubble emerges,
boards will be better structured to monitor management on behalf of the owners of
the companies. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the reforms by the public exchanges
Dent, supra note 15, at 895; Ribstein, supra note 1, at 11.
128 Ribstein, supranote 1, at 10.
129 Scholarship on the topic of the advisability of increased shareholder participation
in the control of corporations (be it in the form of shareholder nominations or making
shareholder resolutions binding) has often focused on whether a given proposal would
maximize shareholder wealth. See Camara, supra note 30, at 11. In the aggregate, this
proposal would probably increase shareholder wealth by making corporate decisions and
data more transparent.
130 Bebchuk, supra note 56, at 18.
131 Id. at 19.
127
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respond only to the most egregious examples of corporate fraud: personal loans to
executives, board members with financial ties to the corporation being classified as
"independent," and auditors viewing their services as "loss leaders" that provided
an entree into more lucrative consulting contracts. As SEC Chairman William H.
Donaldson has remarked:
A "check the box" approach to good corporate governance will not inspire a
true sense of ethical obligation. It could merely lead to an array of inhibiting,
"politically correct" dictates. If this was the case, ultimately corporations would not
strive to meet higher standards, they would only strain under new costs associated
132
with fulfilling a mandated process that could produce little of the desired effect.
Some unmonitored managers will inevitably succumb to the temptation to profit
from their positions by fraudulent means. More basic structural reform is needed to
prevent a future generation of corporate mismanagement.
V.

Conclusion

The SEC's proposed rules offer shareholders a limited opportunity for an
increased voice in selecting their own agents. A more direct approach, and one that
is the norm in the venture capital arena, is to place a shareholder on the board.
Including a shareholder on the board of directors signals that a corporation has
nothing to hide. Corporations that do so will have a director with a long-term
financial incentive to monitor the other directors' actions and to ensure that they
advance the shareholders' interests. Letting the money do the governing gives the
task to those most inclined to govern well.

132 William H. Donaldson, Remarks at the 2003 Washington Economic Policy
Conference (Mar. 24, 2003), quoted in REPORT OF ABA TAsK FORCE, supra note 16, at 29 n.60.
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